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BANKRUPTCY LAW-AvOIDANCE OF DIVORCE LIENS UNDER
SECTION 522(f)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: ALL'S FAIR IN
LOVE AND DIVORCE
INTRODUCTION

Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code t ("Code") allows a debtor
to exempt certain property, real and personal, from the debtor's bank
ruptcy estate. 2 The Code provides these exemptions in order to pro
tect the debtor from his or her creditors and to provide a "fresh start"
for the debtor with at least the "basic necessities of life."3 Section
522(f)(I) of the Code allows a debtor to avoid judicial liens that are
viewed as impairing these exemptions. To avoid a lien under this sec
tion, a debtor must satisfy three requirements: (1) the lien must be a
judicial lien; (2) the lien must impair an exemption to which the
debtor is entitled; and (3) the debtor must possess the property inter
est to which the lien fixed, prior to the fixing of the lien on that prop
1. The Bankruptcy Code is the name commonly used when referring to The Bank
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988».
2. 11 u.s.c. § 522(b) (1988) provides in relevant part:
an individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in
either paragraph (1) or, in the alternative, paragraph (2) of this subsection....
Such property is-
(1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section ...; or, in
the alternative,
(2)(A) any property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection
(d) of this section, or State or loca1law that is applicable on the date of the
filing of the petition . . ..
Id.
II U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) states:
The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(I) of this section:
(1) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in real
property . . . that the debtor or a dependent of the debtor uses as a
residence ....
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988) provides:
(a) The commencement of a case under ... this title creates an estate. Such
estate is comprised of ... all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property
as of the commencement of the case.
Id.
3. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of
bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy.
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erty interest. 4
One type of lien that has been the recent focus of decisions involv
ing section 522(f)(I) is the "divorce lien."s The divorce lien, which is
generally created during the division of the marital assets in a divorce
proceeding, is commonly utilized in divorce law to secure an equitable
distribution of the marital property.6 For example, one spouse may be
granted a lien on the marital home, while title to the home is granted
to the other spouse. When the spouse with title to the home enters
into bankruptcy, claims a homestead exemption, and then attempts to
avoid his or her former spouse's lien on the marital property by claim
ing that the lien impairs that exemption, a conflict arises between
bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy and divorce law's doctrine .of
equitable distribution. 7
After the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 8 and
prior to the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot,9 four federal courts of appeals, as well as many bank
ruptcy and district courts, considered the ability of a debtor spouse to
avoid a divorce lien under section 522(f)(I) of the Code. These courts
reached different results.lO Some courts decided that the divorce lien
could not be avoided as the lien did not attach to the debtor spouse's
interest in the property (as required by section 522(f)(I», but rather
attached to the creditor spouse's pre-existing interest in the property. I I
Other courts allowed the debtor spouse to avoid the lien on the theory
4. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988) states:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a
lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an
exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of
this section, if such lien is.
(1) a judicial lien ....

Id.
5. A "divorce lien" is a lien against the marital home held by the ex-spouse not in
possession of the home. See infra text accompanying notes 69-71. However, not all di
vorce liens are judicial liens. See infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
6. See Peter H. Arkison, The Death of the "Divorce Lien?", NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER, Aug. 1988, at 6.
7. See infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of equitable
distribution.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988».
9. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991). See infra Section II.B. for a discussion of Farrey v.
Sanderfoat.
10. See cases cited infra notes 78-79.
11. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Rittenhouse, 103 B.R.
250 (D. Kan. 1989); Zachary v. Zachary (In re Zachary), 99 B.R. 916 (S.D. Ind. 1989); In
re Alvarado, 92 B.R. 923 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988).
A pre-existing interest in this context is an interest that existed prior to the divorce,
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that the divorce decree extinguished any pre-existing interest the cred
itor spouse may have had and gave sole interest in the marital property
to the debtor spouse. Consequently, the lien could only have attached
to the debtor's interest and, thus, could be avoided under section
522(f)(1).12
The Supreme Court in Farrey determined that the divorce lien
held by the ex-wife could not be avoided. 13 The Court held that the
debtor (Sanderfoot) did not meet the third requirement of section
522(f)(1) in that Sanderfoot did not possess the specific interest to
which the lien fixed, before the lien fixed. 14 In Farrey, the divorce
decree granted to the husband (Sanderfoot) sole ownership of the mar
ital home, which had been held by Sanderfoot and his wife (Farrey) as
joint tenants during their marriage. IS Farrey was awarded a lien on
the house to secure her share of the marital assets.16 The Court found
that under Wisconsin law the Sanderfoot-Farrey divorce decree extin
guished both Sanderfoot's and Farrey's pre-existing interests in the
marital property and created new ones. 17 Sanderfoot acquired his new
interest in the property (a fee simple) with Farrey's lien already at
tached. 18 Since he never possessed the fee simple interest to which
Farrey's lien attached, before the lien attached, he could not avoid it.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Farrey clarifies the ap
plication of section 522(f)(1) to divorce liens, to a certain extent, the
opportunity for a debtor spouse to employ section 522(f)(I) as a stra
tegic tool to wipe out his or her debt to the former spouse still remains.
The Supreme Court's decision turned on when the lien was "fixed"
and on the form of ownership in which the couple had held the prop
erty prior to their divorce. Instead of producing a bright line rule that
would end the manipulation of the Code by crafty debtor spouses, the
Supreme Court's decision left the answer to the question of avoidance
dependent upon several variables. These variables include the form of
ownership in which the spouses had held the property prior to divorce,
that is, an interest (either legal or equitable) in the marital property that belonged to a
spouse while the marriage existed.
12. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III
S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989);
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988); Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85
B.R. 80 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
13. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830-31.
14. Id. See a/so text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) supra note 4.
15. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1827.
16. [d.
17. Id. at 1830.
18. [d.
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how the applicable state law views marital property at the time of di
vorce, and a court's interpretation of when the lien "fixed." Congress
should amend section 522(f)(1) of the Code to except from avoidance
under it, liens on the marital home that are granted to a former spouse
in a divorce proceeding to secure an equitable distribution of the mari
tal property. Otherwise, a divorcing spouse who accepts such a lien as
security for a later division of the marital property, will still be left
vulnerable to losing his or her share of the marital property under
section 522(f)(1) if the debtor spouse enters bankruptcy. The debtor
spouse in this situation is unjustly enriched by his or her share of the
acquisition of the former spouse's share of the dissolved marriage
while the former spouse must struggle to achieve his or her new start
after the lien is avoided.
Section I of this Note describes the general history and purpose of
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,19 with a specific focus on the
statutory language, purpose, and legislative history of section 522(f).
Section I also briefly describes the purpose and practices of divorce
law in the division and settlement of the marital property. Section II
reviews the conflicting interpretations as to whether section 522(f)(I)
empowers the possessory debtor spouse to avoid a lien given to the
nonpossessory creditor spouse in a divorce settlement. This Section
first focuses on the conflicting rationales of the Courts of Appeals for
the Eighth and the Seventh Circuits in the cases of Boyd v. Robinson 20
and In re Sanderfoot,21 respectively. Section II then discusses the de
cision of the Supreme Court in Farrey v. Sanderfoot. 22 Section III
demonstrates the impact of the Farrey decision on future divorce liens
by applying the Farrey analysis to the four federal courts of appeals'
cases that were decided prior to Farrey. This Section separates the
cases into two categories: marital property held in joint tenancy and
marital property held in only one spouse's name. This Section demon
strates the problem areas left open by the Farrey decision. Finally,
Section IV proposes a solution to the conflict and confusion. Section
522(f)(1) should be amended so that liens on the marital home that
are granted to a former spouse in a divorce proceeding to secure an
equitable distribution of the marital property cannot be avoided in
bankruptcy.
19. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
20. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
21. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991); see infra notes 114
39 and accompanying text.
22. 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
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BACKGROUND

In the area of divorce liens, bankruptcy law and divorce law pres
ently conflict. A general look at these two areas of law better illus
trates this conflict. This Section first discusses the general history and
purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,23 specifically focusing
on the purpose and legislative history of section 522(f)(1). Then it
discusses how the division and settlement of marital property is gener
ally achieved in divorce, specifically focusing on the doctrine of equita
ble distribution and the use of divorce liens to achieve such a
distribution.

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and Section 522(f)
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197824 replaced the National
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (" 1898 Act").25 The 1898 Act,26 which had
been frequently amended and modified over the years, "became much
too inflexible and antiquated to deal with consumer and business fi
nancial failures in modern society."27 As a result, a comprehensive
modernization of the nation's bankruptcy laws was undertaken. 28 Af
ter several years of study and numerous congressional hearings and
debates, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,29
which became effective October 1, 1979. The purpose of the Act was
A.

23. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988».
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 55-171, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
26. Id.
27. 1 ALAN N. REsNICK & EUGENE M. WYPYSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY Preface (1979).
28. See Stewart E. Bland, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Overview, 44 Ky.
BENCH & B. 8 (1980).
In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States to study the current bankruptcy laws and to recommend changes for modernizing
the current bankruptcy law system. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
In 1973, in its report, the commission found that the old bankruptcy system produced
substantial administrative costs, inefficiencies, and delays; inadequacy of relief for both
debtors and creditors; and a lack of uniformity in the practices of the courts and the treat
ment of debtors and creditors. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 3-4
(1973).
29. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as aniended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988». Overall, the Code has simplified and streamlined the bankruptcy system. Specifi
cally in the area of exemptions, the debtor was given increased exemptions, as well as other
protections from creditors, and the classes of creditors and their rights were more clearly
defined. Bland, supra note 28, at 8.
The report of the House Judiciary Committee stated: "This bill is not primarily a
debtor's bill, however. The bill codifies creditors' rights more clearly than the case law,
which is in many ways just developing. It defines protections to which a secured creditor is
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to create an efficient bankruptcy system where the primary focus was
to provide the debtor with a "fresh start, free from creditor harass
ment and free from the worries and pressures of too much debt."30
When a petition for bankruptcy is filed under Chapter 7,31 either
by the debtor (a voluntary bankruptcy) or by the creditors of the
debtor (an involuntary bankruptcy), an estate of the debtor is cre
ated. 32 This estate is comprised of all of the debtor's legal and equita
ble interest in his or her property, wherever located, as of the
commencement of the case. 33 The estate is then liquidated and the
proceeds distributed among the debtor's creditors. 34 However, a
debtor is permitted to exempt certain property from the estate. 35 This
exempted property is not made available t() creditors for any unpaid
debt that remains after the estate has been fully administered. Instead,
this property remains with the debtor, thereby providing the debtor
with a basis for a fresh start. 36
Under the 1898 Act, as amended, the debtor had to declare his or
her exemptions according to the law of the state in which he or she
resided, as there was no uniform federal exemption policy.37 This led
to a "denial or loss of exemptions [to debtors] as a result of inequitable
provisions of state law" regarding exemptions and waivers.38 In addi
tion, most states had not raised the dollar level of their exemptions
since their creation, which, in practice, attenuated the ameliorative ef
fect of exemptions. 39 The Code provides a federal list of exemptions. 4O
entitled, and the means through which the court may grant that protection." H.R. REp.
No. 595, supra note 3, at 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5966.
30. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 125, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6086.
31. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988). Chapter 7 of the Code provides relief to debtors
through liquidation. LAWRENCE P. KING & MICHAEL L. CooK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS,
DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY § 1O.03[A], at 608 (2d ed. 1989).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988).
33. Id.
34. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 3.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (1988).
Some kinds of property that may be exempted (limited by dollar amounts) include real
property, a motor vehicle, household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appli
ances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, jewelry, professional books or tools, as
well as some intangible property rights, such as the right to receive a social security or a
veterans' benefit. See generally id. at § 522(d).
36. William S. Parkinson, The Lien Avoidance Section o/the Bankruptcy Code: Can
It Be Avoided By State Exemption Statutes?, 11 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 319,320 (1984).
37. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 171.
38. H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 169. In a waiver of exemption clause,
a debtor agrees to relinquish his right to exempt property that is subject to a lien. Parkin
son, supra note 36, at 324.
39. Most state exemption laws were "outmoded, [having been] designed for more
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In addition, the congressional committee and conference reports

noted that unsecured consumer and commercial creditors, sensing a
debtor's imminent bankruptcy, often rushed into court to obtain liens.
on exempt property prior to the debtor's entry into bankruptcy.41 Be
cause the 1898 Act did not provide "certain rights ... with respect to
exempt property," one of which was the right to "void any judicial
lien on exempt propertY,"42 a debtor usually could not avoid these
liens and creditors were able to defeat the debtor's exemptions. 43 This
frustrated the purpose of exemptions, which is to provide the debtor
with the "basic necessities of life" so as to prevent the debtor from
rural times, and hopelessly inadequate to ... provide a fresh start for modem urban debt
ors." H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6087.
40. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). See generally 7 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.
1991).
The commission recommended that there be a federal list of exemptions and that the
then current state and federal laws governing exemptions be superseded. H.R. Doc. No.
137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 170. After changes by both the House and the Senate, the
provision ultimately adopted in the Code allows the debtor to choose between the federal
exemptions or state exemptions. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 323. However, the state has
the right to "opt-out" of the federal list in § 522(d). 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (d) (1988). Pres
ently, a majority of states have "opted-out." Robert H. Bowmar, Avoidance Of Judicial
Liens That Impair Exemptions In Bankruptcy; The Workings Of 11 u.s.c. § 522(f)(1), 63
AM. BANKR. L.J. 375, 383 (1989). A state that "opts-out" of the federal list of exemptions
is not held to have "opted-out" of § 522(0 (lien avoidance). Id. at 385.
The federal homestead exemption in § 522(d) for the debtor's aggregate interest in real
property is 57500. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). The state exemptions vary extensively. See. e.g.,
ARK. CoDE ANN. § 16-66-218 (Michie 1987) (allowing a debtor to exempt 5800 for un
married debtors or 51250 for married debtors in a residence); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 188, § 1
(1990) (allowing a debtor to exempt 5100,000 in principal family residence).
Furthermore, in some of these states the exemption statutes limit the circumstances
under which a debtor can claim a homestead exemption. See generally Holtzhauser v.
Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (stating that the
homestead exemption in NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-101 (1988) only applies to general judg
ment liens arising under NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1301 (1985) and not judgment liens arising
from divorce proceedings under NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-371 (1988»; In re Stone, 119 B.R.
222 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1990) (stating that the specific language of Washington's home
stead exemption limits what liens actually impair the homestead exemption).
41. H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6087. An "unsecured creditor" is generally one who has no security interest such as a
mortgage, a lien, or some sort of coIlateral, in the property of the debtor. KING & COOK,
supra note 31, § 1.07, at 5 (2d ed. 1989).
42. H.R. REp. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6087.
A "lien" is an interest in property to secure payment of a debt. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(33) (1988). By obtaining a lien on the property, the creditor can proceed against that
property to enforce the claim. KING & CooK, supra note 31, § 3.07, at 120. When a lien is
avoided, the creditor no longer has a right to enforce the underlying debt against the prop
erty that was subject to the lien.
43. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 324.
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being left "destitute and a public charge."44
Section 522 of the Code was enacted to rectify these deficien
45
cies. Section 522 details what exemptions are available to the debtor
. and how the debtor can make use of these exemptions in bankruptcy.
The various subsections of section 522 deal with basic definitions,46
what property may be exempted,47 amounts of exemptions,48 liability
during and after the bankruptcy proceeding,49 waiver of exemptions, 50
and several other aspects of exemptions not pertinent to this
discussion.51
Section 522(f) addresses the avoidance of liens on certain quali
fied exempt property to which a debtor has claimed an exemption,
specifically addressing avoidance of judicial liens in section
522(f)(1).52 Section 522(f) passed through Congress without modifi
cation or debate, leaving little indication as to the intention of Con
gress in enacting it. 53 However, the commission and committee
reports contain a substantial amount of material regarding the purpose
of section 522(f)(I).54 According to these reports, section 522(f)(1)
allows a debtor to avoid certain types of liens encumbering specific
qualified exempt property so that he or she may have a basis for reha
bilitation. 55 The ability to avoid judicial liens on exempt property per
mits "the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal
action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy."56 Thus, even if a
44.
6087.

H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at

45. Id. at 6087-88.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a) (1988).
47. Id. § 522(b), (d) (allowing exemptions on certain real and personal property of
the debtor).
48. Id. § 522(d) (allowing maximum of $7500 on real property).
49. Id. § 522(c) (indicating exempt property not liable for pre-petition claims except
tax and alimony or support claims excepted from discharge, and unavoided liens).
50. Id. § 522(e) (indicating waivers of exemptions unenforceable).
51. Id. § 522(g)-(m).
52. See supra note 4 for text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
53. Parkinson, supra note 36, at 324.
54. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 125-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6086-88.
56. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, reprinted in 1978 u.S.C.C.A.N. at
6087. The provision also was enacted to counter the superior bargaining position of credi
tors who obtained blanket mortgages and waivers of exemptions from debtors. Id. A
debtor who signed a blanket mortgage (a mortgage that covers more than one asset to
secure the given debt) or a waiver of exemptions has allowed the creditor to repossess
much, if not all, of the debtor's household goods if the debtor encounters trouble paying the
creditor. Id. at 6088. The Code addresses this problem by allowing the debtor to invali
date nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests, such as blanket mortgages,
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creditor beats a debtor into court, the debtor is still entitled to his or
her exemptions and a fresh start.
When the lien is created through divorce, rather than a commer
cial transaction, avoiding it raises additional policy concerns.57 A
nonpossessory spouse (creditor) who has relied on a divorce lien to
secure his or her interest in the marital property against a spouse
granted title to the home who later becomes insolvent, is not like a
commercial creditor "beating" the debtor into court. Allowing a
debtor spouse to avoid a divorce lien does not appear to address Con
gress' concerns, unless the divorce lien has been used by the nonpos
sessory spouse as an attempt to "lock up" the assets of the other
spouse just prior to bankruptcy. Only in this, comparatively rare, cir
cumstance are the congressional concerns underlying section 522(f)(1)
implicated in divorce liens.
B.

Divorce Law and the Use of Divorce Liens

As bankruptcy law has had to evolve in light of modem financial
transactions,58 divorce law has also evolved in response to modem so
cietal, cultural, and political changes. 59 Before the 1970's, in most of
the United States the marital home was held in one spouse's name.
When a couple divorced, the marital home was automatically granted
through the lien avoidance provision. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988). Section 522(fX2)
states, in part;
[A] debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property
to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is- ...
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any
(A) household furnishings, household goods, ... that are held primarily
for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor ....

Id.
This negates any unfair advantage over-reaching creditors may have used. H.R. Doc.
No. 137, supra note 28, pt. I, at 127. The Code also made waivers of exemptions invalid, so
that a debtor could not be forced to sign a waiver by a creditor in a superior bargaining
position. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5862.
57. Even in the commercial transaction more than just economic interests are in
volved. As one commentator has expressed, "[m]ore realistically and profoundly, ec0
nomic conflicts between participants of financial distress are occasions for the expression of
their more fundamental moral, political, personal, and social values." Donald R.
Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence ofBankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717,
764 -65 (1991). This article presents a value-based account of bankruptcy law, as an alter
native to the economic account, in the context of corporate bankruptcy.
58. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
59. LAWRENCE I. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.01, at 2
(1983).
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to the "owner" spouse solely on the basis of title;60 the other spouse
might be awarded alimony or maintenance in an attempt to offset the
grant of the home to the spouse with title. 61 Today, marriage is
viewed as a partnership with both spouses contributing to the well
being and success of the singular marital unit. 62 When the marriage
fails, courts now divide the marital property under the doctrine of eq
uitable distribution. 63
Under this doctrine, the property of the marriage is allocated
upon an equitable, although not necessarily equal, basis. 64 The alloca
tion is based upon several factors, including but not limited to the con
tributions of each spouse "whether directly by employment or
indirectly by providing homemaker services,"6S upon each spouse's
conduct during the marriage, and their anticipated needs at and after
divorce. 66 The purpose of equitable distribution is to treat both parties
fairly and provide each with a basis for making a new beginning in
their newly separate lives.
Although equitable distribution is now a national policy, the ap
plicable statutes for carrying out the doctrine vary quite dramatically
from one state to another.67 There is neither uniform state law nor
60. Id. Under the traditional common law approach, all rights to marital property
arise solely from the title to the property and not through any tangible or non-tangible
contributions to the property by the non-titled spouse during the marriage. This means
that where one spouse has title to the property but the other does not, the titled spouse
would get the property in a divorce proceeding no matter what contributions were made by
the non-titled spouse. The non-titled spouse's only recourse was a discretionary award of
alimony, support or maintenance. See id. at 4-5.
61. See id. at 2, 5.
62. GoLDEN, supra note 59, at 1-2 (citing In re Marriage of Komnick, 417 N.E.2d
1305 (Ill. 1981); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974»; see also Jana B. Singer,
Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REv. 1103, 1114 (1989).
63. GoLDEN, supra note 59, at 1-3.
Currently, all non-community property states have adopted some form of equitable
distribution, either through statute or by judicial decision. Equitable Distribution Adopted
by West Virginia's High Court, 9 FAM. L. REp. (BNA) 1133 (June 28, 1983). See generally
Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 21
FAM. L.Q. 417, 452-62 (1988).
A community property state views property acquired during the marriage as joint or
marital property, with a few exceptions that certain property (the primary home not in
cluded) be considered separate property. Title alone does not determine ownership.
GOLDEN, supra note 59, at 6.
64. GoLDEN, supra note 59, § 8.05, at 240-42.
65. Id. § 1.01, at 2.
66. Id. § 8.20, at 268.
67. Id. § 1.01, at 2-3.
The equitable distribution statutes detailing how a division is made vary greatly from
state to state. These statutes range from those which are quite complex and detailed, pro
viding lists of factors for consideration in making the final award, to those which are simple
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federal law in the area of marriage and divorce. 68 Nevertheless, one
very common method of implementing an equitable distribution is the
use of the "divorce lien."69 A court creating a divorce lien grants one
spouse the marital home and grants the other spouse a lien against the
home in the amount of his or her share of the marital property to
secure later payment of that share. A divorce lien is often chosen,
either by the parties or the courts, in order to avoid a forced sale of the
home at the time of divorce while assuring the creditor spouse an
eventual interest in the marital assets.70 Often the lien-holding spouse
must wait until a specified number of years have passed, a specified
event has occurred, or the property is sold to enforce the lien.7l
A conflict between bankruptcy law's "fresh start" policy and di
vorce law's doctrine of equitable distribution occurs when the spouse
who was granted the marital home enters bankruptcy and attempts to
avoid his or her former spouse's lien on the home under section
522(f)(1). Different interpretations of section 522(f)(1) by the lower
courts have exacerbated this conflict and caused much confusion. Re
cently, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the conflict and clarify
the situation.
II.

CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 522(f)(I)
AMONG THE LoWER COURTS AND THE SUPREME
COURT REsPONSE

The lack of consensus among the courts in interpreting the statu
tory language of section 522(f)(1) reflects the difficulties presented by
the divorce lien issue. Although the literal reading of the statutory
words seems to require avoidance of the lien, this produces not only an
unjust result, but apparently was not what Congress intended.72
and straightforward, merely stating that the court should make an equitable distribution of
the marital property. Id. at 2.
68. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), which is a recommendation
for uniform state laws in this area, has been adopted in some form by only a few states. See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF
THE NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PRO
CEEDINGS 1986 (1990); see also Jane Rutheford, Duty In Divorce: Shared Income As A
Path To Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 539, 547-48 n.46 (1990).
The UMDA requires an equitable distribution of marital property and supports the
use ofa lien to accomplish that end. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 307, 9A U.L.A.
238-39 (1987).
69. Arkison, supra note 6, at 6.
70. A forced sale is not looked on favorably primarily because a forced sale generally
brings a price for the home at lower than fair market value.
71. Arkison, supra note 6, at 6.
72. See supra notes 54 -56 for a discussion of Congress' intent in passing § 522(f)(1).
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Under section 522(f)(I), a debtor must satisfy three requirements in
order to avoid a lien: (1) the lien must be a judicial lien; (2) the lien
must impair an exemption to which the debtor is entitled; and (3) the
debtor must possess the property interest to which the lien fixed,
before the lien was fixed on it. 73
Some courts have focused on whether the lien is a judicial lien, 74
or whether the lien impaired an exemption of the debtor,75 two of the
three prongs of section 522(f)(1). However, most courts, including
the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Farrey v. Sander/oot, 76
have focused on the third prong, which requires that the debtor pos
sess the interest in the exempt property prior to the attachment of the
lien. 77 Some of these courts have held that the specific divorce lien
involved could not be avoided because the creditor spouse possessed
an ownership interest, either legal or equitable, in the exempt property
prior to the divorce, and that the attachment of the lien simultane
ously with the transfer of the home essentially transformed the credi
tor spouse's pre-existing ownership interest into that of a mortgage. 78
Other courts have held that the divorce lien involved could be avoided
on the basis that the divorce decree extinguished any pre-existing in
terest of the non-debtor spouse. Consequently, the divorce lien at
tached only to the debtor's interest in the property and not to any pre
existing interest of the non-debtor. 79 The Supreme Court granted cer
tiorari in In re Sander/oot to resolve the conflict in the lower courts
73. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
74. For cases holding that a divorce lien is a judicial lien, see Stedman v. Pederson
(In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir.
1988); In re Boggess, 105 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); In re Brothers, 100 B.R. 565
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989).
For cases holding that a divorce lien is not a judicial lien, see Borman v. Leiker (In re
Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989) (equitable lien); Parker v. Donahue (In re Dona
hue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir.
1984) (mortgage); Wicks v. Wicks, 26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (consensual lien).
75. Most of the earlier cases dealing with divorce liens either did not address this
element or gave it cursory reference. Recently, this element has become the main focus of a
few cases which held that the divorce lien could not be avoided. See In re Stone, 119 B.R.
222 (Bankr. B.D. Wash. 1990); Holtzhauser v. Holtzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R.
519 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
76. III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
77. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(l).
78. Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989); Boyd v. Robin
son, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 86-113, 176-87 and accompanying text.
79. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 1825 (1991); Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989);
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988); see infra notes 114-39, 166-75,207-20 and
accompanying text.
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regarding the interpretation and application of section 522(f)(1) to
liens on marital property created at the time of divorce.
A.

Two Conflicting Interpretations of Section 522(f)(l) in the
Courts ofAppeals: Boyd v. Robinson 80 and In re
Sandeifoot 81

The two major conflicting interpretations of section 522(f)(1) are
exemplified by Boyd v. Robinson 82 and In re Sandeifoot. 83 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the first court of appeals to address
this issue, held in Boyd that the lien was not avoidable. 84 In contrast,
in Sandeifoot, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit allowed
avoidance of the divorce lien.8s
1.

Boyd v. Robinson 86

In Boyd, the former wife (Boyd) purchased the marital home
prior to the marriage and retained title in her name. In the divorce
proceeding, the court found that the home was "partially marital
property"87 and granted Boyd the home "subject to a lien for one-half
of the equity [acquired] by the parties together after marriage. "88 The
amount of this lien was $7000. 89 Shortly after the divorce decree,
Boyd filed for bankruptcy and sought to avoid her ex-husband's
(Robinson) lien under section 522(f)(I).90 The bankruptcy court, in
80. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
81. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
82. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
The issue of avoidance of a divorce lien was not addressed again by a federal court of
appeals until 1988. In Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit allowed a wife, in possession of the home free and clear of any and all
claims of the other spouse, to avoid the divorce lien held by her husband. Id. at 939. In
1989, both the Ninth and the Tenth Circuits addressed the issue. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, in Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989),
allowed a husband to avoid a divorce lien held by his wife on the basis of the reasoning in
the dissent in Boyd. Id. at 783. The Tenth Circuit, in Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman),
886 F.2d 273 (lOth Cir. 1989), severely limited its decision in Maus one year earlier when it
held the debtor-husband could not avoid his former wife's divorce lien. Id. at 274.
In 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Farrey v.
Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
83. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (199\).
84. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1115.
85. Sander/oot, 899 F.2d at 605.
86. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
87. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 593 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd, 741
F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
88. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113 (citing the Designated Record (D.R.) 27).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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allowing Boyd to avoid the lien, held that the lien was a judiciallien91
and, therefore, subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1).92 The
district court reversed because it saw the lien not as a judicial lien but
rather as an equitable mortgage,93 which did not impair Boyd's inter
est in the home but instead represented Robinson's pre-existing inter
est in the property under Minnesota statutory law. 94 This decision
was upheld on appeal. 95
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that section
522(f)(1) permits a debtor to avoid a lien if (1) the lien attaches to an
interest of the debtor in exempt property; and (2) the lien is a judicial
lien. 96 As to the first requirement, the court held that Robinson (cred
itor) had a pre-existing interest in the homestead that was created
under the Minnesota statutes and that antedated the divorce. 97 Addi
tionally, the court held that the divorce lien attached to this pre-ex
isting interest, rather than to Boyd's interest, which was created by the
divorce. Therefore, that lien could not be avoided under section
522(f)(1).98
The court gave three reasons supporting its determination that
Robinson's lien attached to his pre-existing interest in the home rather
than to the debtor spouse's interest. First, in order to convey a home
stead in Minnesota, the signatures of both spouses are necessary on the
deed even if title to the home is held only by one spouse. Accordingly,
when he married Boyd, Robinson "acquired an interest in the home
stead by which he could either approve or reject the conveyance of the
91. II U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988) defines "judicial lien" as "a lien obtained by judg
ment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id.
92. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113. Contra Wicks v. Wicks, 26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982). Wicks was decided on the same day by the same bankruptcy court that decided
Boyd. In Wicks, the court held the divorce lien was not avoidable under § 522(f)(1). Id. at
772. Wicks had the same basic fact pattern and issue as Boyd; the only difference was that
in Wicks the divorce lien was agreed to by stipUlation of the parties instead of ordered by
the family court in a contested divorce. Id. at 771.
93. An "equitable mortgage" is "[a]ny agreement to post certain property as security
before the security agreement is formalized." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (6th ed.
1990). For the definition of "mortgage", see infra note 112 and accompanying text.
94. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 594-95 (D. Minn. 1983), aff'd, 741
F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). For applicable statutory language, see infra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text.
95. Boyd, 741 F.2d at IllS.
96. Id. at 1112-13. The court did not specifically address the third element of
§ 522(f)(1), which is whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is entitled,
although the district court did address the third element. Since the court of appeals de
cided that the lien did not attach to Boyd's interest in the home, it follows that the lien
could not have impaired Boyd's homestead exemption.
97. Id. at 1114.
98. Id. at 1113-14.
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homestead. "99 Second, Robinson used his own nonmarital funds to
construct a driveway and a garage during the marriage, thereby gain
ing a partial ownership interest. loo Finally, because Minnesota's di
vorce statutes require a " 'just and equitable division of the marital
property,' ... Robinson had an undivided [ownership] interest in [as
much of] the equity ofthe homestead [as was] acquired through mari
tal funds."lOl
Since the court of appeals decided that the first requirement
clearly was not met according to Minnesota statutory law, the court
did not directly decide the second issue, which was whether this lien
was a judicial lien. However, the court did refer to two state statutes
that in essence equate a divorce lien with an equitable mortgage. 102
One statute defines "mortgage" to include "a decree of marriage disso
lution or an instrument made pursuant to it,"103 and the other statute
indicates that "a decree of marriage dissolution or an instrument made
pursuant to it, relating to real estate shall be valid as security for any
debt." 104 The court stated that the purpose of the statutes was to
provide spouses with greater protection for property rights "created
during the marriage and determined [later] in a dissolution
proceeding." 105
In dissent, Judge Ross maintained that the lien should have been
avoided even though "permitting avoidance of this lien is a harsh re
sult."I06 Judge Ross first argued that under Minnesota law the di
vorce decree granted the property outright to Boyd, ending any
interest Robinson had in the marital property. Therefore, the only
interest to which the lien could attach was Boyd's.107 Robinson's in
terest in the marital home was dissolved by the divorce decree and
became nothing more than collateral for Boyd's property settlement
debt. lOS
Furthermore, on the second issue, the dissent argued that Robin
son's lien was a "judicial lien" as defined in the Code. The Code de
99. Id. at 1114.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1984».
102. Id. at 1113-14. For a discussion of whether a divorce lien is an equitable lien or
an equitable mortgage, see Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir.
1988).
103. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 287.01(3) (West 1991).
104. Id. § 287.03 (emphasis added).
105. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114.
106. Id. at 1116 (Ross, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 1115.
108. Id.
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fines "lien" as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation,"l09 and "judicial
lien" as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other
legal or equitable process or proceeding."110 The dissent stated that
Robinson's lien, an interest in property to secure a debt, was created
by the judgment of the divorce court, not by agreement of the parties
(a consensual security interest)lll nor through a contract or convey
ance (a mortgage).112 Therefore, the dissent argued that Robinson's
lien must have been a judicia1lien. 113

2. In re Sander/oat 114
In re Sander/oat represents the most recent United States court of
appeals decision on the issue of whether a debtor spouse can avoid a
former spouse's divorce lien on the marital home pursuant to section
522(f)(1). In 1986, after twenty years of marriage Gerald Sanderfoot
and Jeanne Farrey divorced. Pursuant to their divorce decree, the
court assigned various assets and debts to the parties. The court
awarded the marital home, which the couple had held as joint tenants,
to the husband, Sanderfoot.llS After these assignments were made,
Mr. Sanderfoot had an estate of $59,508.79, while Ms. Farrey had an
estate worth $1091.90}16 In order to secure a more equitable distribu
tion of the marital property, as was required by state law, 117 the court
ordered Mr. Sanderfoot to pay Ms. Farrey approximately $29,000, in
two equal installments. 1IS This debt was to be secured by a lien in
109. 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988).
110. Id. § 101(32).
111. A "consensuaIlien" is a secured claim that is created by the consent and agree
ment "between the debtor and the creditor and called a 'security interest' by the Code."
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
112. A "mortgage" is "an interest in land created by a written instrument providing
security for ... the payment ofa debt." BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 1009 (6th ed. 1990).
Some courts have held that divorce liens are equitable mortgages or liens, even though
they are created by a court. See Borman v. Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir.
1989); Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (lOth Cir. 1988); Hart v. Hart (In
re Hart), 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Hartley v. Liberty Park Assocs., 774 P.2d 40
(Wash. App. 1989).
113. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ross, J., dissenting).
114. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
115. Id. at 599. Farrey was granted "half the refund and/or liability with respect to
the couple's 1985 income taxes, certain personal property, and half the proceeds of items
ordered sold at auction." Id.
116. Id.
117. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981).
118. Sander/oat, 899 F.2d at 599.
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favor of Ms. Farrey on the marital home.119
Four months later ·Sanderfoot filed for bankruptcy and attempted
to avoid his ex-wife's lien on the home by claiming that it impaired his
homestead exemption. 120 In denying Sanderfoot's motion to avoid,
the bankruptcy court primarily relied on the language and legislative
history of section 522(f)( 1),121 and on Boyd, because it saw Wisconsin
case law as similar to Minnesota statutory law. 122
On appeal, the district court reversed and allowed Sanderfoot to
avoid the lien. 123 The court stated, with little discussion, that the lien
was a judicial lien that impaired Sanderfoot's homestead exemption,
and that the divorce decree extinguished whatever pre-existing inter
ests the parties had and created new ones. 124 Therefore, Sanderfoot
had met the three prongs of section 522(f)(1) and could avoid his
wife's lien.12S The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision. 126
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit based its decision
on the district court's holding, but discussed each prong of section
522(f)(1) in greater detail. First, the court of appeals concluded that
the lien attached to Sanderfoot's interest in the homestead property. 127
119. Id. The lien was to remain until the debt was paid in full. At the time
Sanderfoot filed for bankruptcy, he had not paid anything to Farrey. Id.
120. Since Wisconsin did not "opt out" under § 522(b)(2)(A), Sanderfoot had the
option of choosing either the federal homestead exemption or Wisconsin's homestead ex
emption. II U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988). See supra note 40. Sanderfoot chose his state
homestead exemption (up to $40,000) instead of the federal homestead exemption (up to
$7500). Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 599.
121. In re Sanderfoot, 83 B.R. 564, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988), rev'd, 92 B.R. 802
(E.D. Wis.), ajJ'd sub nom. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991). The court focused specifically on the phrase "fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor." Id. The court held that because the statute used
"fixing" instead of "fixed," and "interest" instead of "property" Congress intended that a
debtor would be able to avoid "liens that became fixed after the debtor's acquisition of the
interest in the property, not before." Id.
122. Id. at 568. The court stated that although "Wisconsin does not have a statute
defining this type of lien as a mortgage, ... state case law accomplishes the same result."
Id.
123. In re Sanderfoot, 92 B.R. 802, 803 (E.D. Wis. 1988), ajJ'd sub nom. Farrey v.
Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
124. Id. "New interests were simultaneously created: title in the homestead was
given to Mr. Sanderfoot, and Mrs. Sanderfoot acquired a lien on that property." Id.
125. Id.
126. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 599 (7th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
127. Id. at 601-03. The court relied heavily on Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th
Cir. 1988), in determining that Farrey's pre-existing interest in the home was terminated
before Farrey's lien was imposed on the property. For a discussion of Maus, see infra notes
166 -75 and accompanying text.
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Next, the court. held that the lien impaired Sanderfoot's homestead
exemption. 128 Finally, the court held the lien was a judicial lien. 129 In
its conclusion, the court stated it recognized the policy arguments
against avoidance, but claimed "clear legislative judgment" prohibited
it from deciding otherwise. 130
Judge Posner dissented. Embracing the result in Boyd, he argued
that while institutional considerations sometimes override the equities
ofjustice, such considerations were not compelling in this case.131 In a
scathing opinion, he asserted that section 522(f)(I) had become, in the
divorce context, a "tool by which bounders defraud their spouses"132
and "a tactic designed to nullify (or perhaps to complete nullification
of) the divorce decree and give the [debtor spouse] all rather than half
the property."133 Stressing that the decision to avoid these liens was a
result of "judicial misunderstanding" of the lien-avoidance provision,
he referred to the history and purpose of lien avoidance in the Code. 134
He further stated that since the statute refers to "the fixing of" a
lien on a debtor's interest in property, the statute requires that the
debtor possess that interest before the court "fixes" the lien on it. 13S
Since Sanderfoot and Farrey had held the property as joint tenants
prior to the divorce, at no time before the divorce (and attachment of
the lien) did only one spouse have an interest in the property. More
over, the divorce decree did not extinguish Farrey's pre-existing inter
est, but changed it to a different form of interest-a mortgage
interest. 136
Judge Posner further declared, "I am at a loss to understand why
we should strain the language and ignore the purpose of the lien
avoidance statute in order to achieve a result that does not promote,
but instead denies, simple justice ...."137 Upholding the lien would
not create any tension "between legal justice and substantive justice";
128. Since Ms. Farrey did not address this issue, the court detennined she had
waived any right to challenge it. Sander/oot, 899 F.2d at 603.
129. Id. at 603-05. The court used the definitions of lien and judicial lien as found in
the Code. Id. See also Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988).
130. Sander/oat, 899 F.2d at 605.
131. Id. at 606 (posner, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Judge Posner agreed that the Farrey-Sanderfoot divorce lien was a judicial
lien, but contended that divorce liens are generally created to protect a spouse's pre-existing
property rights, not to defeat the debtor's homestead exemptions. Id.
135. Id. at 606.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 607.
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instead, he argued, it would fulfill the purpose of Congress that is em
bodied in the lien-avoidance provision. 13B He concluded that the re
sult reached by the majority distorted the Code by allowing the debtor
to make a "fresh start with someone else's property."139
B.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in In re Sander/oot 140 to
resolve the conflict in the lower courts as to the interpretation and
application of section 522(f)(1) to divorce liens. In a unanimous deci
sion, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and held that section 522(f)(1) "requires a debtor to have possessed an
interest to which a lien attached, before it attached, to avoid the fixing
of the lien on that interest."141 The Court ruled that Sanderfoot had
never possessed his fee simple interest in the home prior to the fixing
of Farrey's divorce lien.142 Consequently, Sanderfoot could not em
ploy section 522(f)(1) to avoid his wife's lien.
To support its holding, the Court referred to the provision's lan
guage and legislative history. The Court began with an analysis of the
language of section 522(f)(1), concentrating solely on its third
prong. 143 The Court maintained that the only question necessary to a
decision was whether section 522(f)(I) permitted Sanderfoot to "avoid
the fixing" of Farrey's lien on the property interest that Sanderfoot
acquired in the divorce decree. l44 Focusing specifically on the stan
dard legal meaning of the verbs "avoid" and "fix," the Court stated
that the use of "[t]he gerund 'fixing; [in the statute] refers to a tempo
ral event. That event-the fastening of a liability-presupposes an ob
ject onto which the liability can fasten."14S The Court then concluded
that unless a debtor had the specific property interest to which the lien
attached prior to the lien's attachment, the debtor could not avoid the
lien under section 522(f)(I).146
The Court supported its interpretation of the provision by exam
138. Id.
Id. at 607-08.
140. 899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990), rey'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
141. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825, 1831 (1991).
142. Id.
143. See supra note 4 for text of II U.S.C. § 522(f)(I).
144. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1828. The Court did not analyze the first two prongs of
§ 522(f)(I) since Ms. Farrey had not challenged that her lien was a judicial lien and had
"waived any challenge [that Mr. Sanderfoot was not] entitled to a homestead exemption
under state law." Id.
145. Id. at 1829.
146. Id.
139.
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ining the provision's purpose and legislative history. Acknowledging
that the broad purpose of section 522(f) was to protect the debtor's
exempt property, the Court pointed out that when the provision was
enacted "it was well settled ... that valid liens obtained before bank
ruptcy could be enforced on exempt property."147 Through the Bank
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Congress essentially preserved this
principle. However, Congress also gave the debtor some relief by al
lowing him or her to avoid the fixing of certain liens-among them,
judicial liens fixed on an interest of a debtor in exempt property. 148
The Court reasoned that Congress had singled out judicial liens
in order to protect debtors from unsecured creditors who rushed into
court to obtain liens on debtor's exempt property prior to the debtor's
entry into bankruptcy.'49 The Court buttressed this theory by refer
ring to the provision's legislative history. ISO However, the Court
maintained that this is not what occurs in a divorce proceeding. Far
rey obtained the lien not to "defeat Sanderfoot's pre-existing interest
in the homestead but to protect her own pre-existing interest in the
homestead" which was fully equal to that of Sanderfoot. ls,
Adopting Judge Posner's analysis, the Court stated that "the crit
ical inquiry [is] whether the debtor ever possessed the interest to which
the lien fixed, before it fixed"ls2 and that this inquiry is a question of
state law. ls3 Consequently, the Court found that under Wisconsin law
the divorce decree extinguished both Mr. Sanderfoot's and Ms. Far
rey's pre-existing undivided half interests and granted the property to
Sanderfoot " 'free and clear' of any claim 'except as expressly provided
in this [divorce decree].' "IS4 Sanderfoot received his new interest and
the lien simultaneously, "as if he had purchased an already encum
bered estate from a third party."ISS Therefore, Sanderfoot never pos
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
150. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126, 126-27 (1978), re
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087-88). see supra notes 45-56 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the legislative history of II U.S.C. § 522.
151. Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1831.
152. Id. at 1830.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a, Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot),
899 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990) (No. 90-350), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991».
155. Id. at 1830-31. The Court found that Mr. Sanderfoot could not avoid the lien
even if the divorce decree had not extinguished the couple's pre-existing interests, but
merely reordered them, i.e., adding Ms. Farrey'S pre-existing interest to that of Mr.
Sanderfoot. Id. at 1831. Since the lien attached to Ms. Farrey's pre-existing interest, when
Mr. Sanderfoot received that interest, it was already with the lien in place. He "would
147.
148.
149.
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sessed his new fee simple interest before Farrey's lien was fixed on
it.ls6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy contended that the
Court's holding left open the possibility that future cases could pro
duce a different result because much "depend[s] upon the relevant
state laws defining the estate owned by a spouse who had a pre-ex
isting interest in marital property and upon state laws governing
awards of property under a decree settling marital rights." IS7 Accord
ing to Wisconsin state law, all property of spouses is presumed to be
marital property and each spouse possesses a present undivided one
half interest in the marital property. ISS Justice Kennedy interpreted
Wisconsin law as reordering, rather than extinguishing, the spouses'
pre-existing interests. Consequently, according to Justice Kennedy,
but for Mr. Sanderfoot's concession that the divorce decree extin
guished these interests, the debtor would· have both retained his pre
existing interest and received his wife's pre-existing interest at the di
vorce, whereupon these two interests would have merged into one es
tate. IS9 Therefore, "as a matter of state law the judicial lien could ...
attach to [Sanderfoot's] predecree interest . . . in the marital prop
erty" and be at least partially avoided under section 522(f).I60
Justice Kennedy therefore concluded that the possibility still ex
ists that the Code could be misused to avoid otherwise valid obliga
tions under a divorce court decree. He warned,
[although] adept drafting of property decrees or the use of court
orders directing conveyances in a certain sequence might resolve the
problem, . . . congressional action may be necessary to avoid in
some future case the ... unjust result the Court today avoids having
to consider only because of the fortuity of [Mr. Sanderfoot's]
concession. 161

Although the Court unanimously held that Mr. Sanderfoot could
not avoid his former wife's lien, the decision is narrow. First, the
Court only addressed one of the three elements that section 522(f)(1)
requires a debtor to meet in order to avoid a lien. 162 Second, in reachnever have [possession of that interest] without the lien already having [been] fixed." Id.
Justice Scalia did not join in this alternate holding. Id. at 1831 n.4.
156. Id. at 1830-31.
157. Id. at 1832.
158. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. § 766.31(2)-(3} (1989)}.
159. Id.
160. Id. See supra note 155 for the majority's response to Justice Kennedy's view.
161. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1832-33.
162. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for the three elements of § 522(f)(1}.
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ing its decision on this one element, the Court relied heavily on several
variables including the form of ownership in which the spouse held the
marital home prior to divorce, how the applicable state law views mar
ital property at the time of divorce, the wording used in the divorce
decree, and a court's interpretation as to the timing of the fixing of the
lien. The Court's reliance on these factors is very significant since in
certain situations a debtor spouse will still be able to manipulate the
Code to avoid a former spouse's divorce lien through use of section
522(f)(I). A look at divorce liens in a post-Farrey world illuminates
the remaining grey areas associated with the application of section
522(f)(I) to divorce liens.
III.

THE

IMPACT

OF FARREY ON FUTURE DIVORCE LIENS

The Supreme Court's decision in Farrey attempted to resolve the
conflict in the lower courts regarding the application of section
522(f)(I) to divorce liens. According to Farrey, in order to avoid a
divorce lien under section 522(f)(I) a debtor must possess the interest
to which the lien is fixed prior to the lien's attachment. 163 While this
rule reaches the fair and equitable result in this case, it will not do so
in all situations where divorce liens exist.
Furthermore, while Farrey resolved some of the conflict as to the
third prong of the provision, it did not end the confusion as to the
other two prongs. The following Section examines the impact of Far
rey on future divorce liens in the context of the factual situations
presented by the four courts of appeals' cases decided before Farrey.
This examination primarily focuses on the form of ownership (joint
tenancy or sole ownership) in which the home is held and the effect of
state law on determining the timing of the attachment of the lien. In
examining these factors, this Section· incorporates the role of equitable
distribution law in determining a debtor spouse's interest in marital
property and the question of whether divorce liens are "judicial liens"
as required under section 522(f)(1).
A.

Joint Tenancies: Maus v. Maus l64 and In re Borman 16S

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided both Maus
and Borman. Although both cases involved marital homes that were
held in joint tenancies, the court in Maus allowed the wife to avoid her
163.
164.
165.

Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830.
837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988).
886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989).
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husband's lien, while in Borman the court did not allow the husband
to avoid his former wife's lien.
1.

Maus v. Maus l66

In Maus, the spouses reached a verbal property settlement which
was incorporated into the divorce decree. Nikki Maus (the wife) was
granted the home "free and clear of any and all claims" of Jesse Maus
(her former husband). 167 Nikki was also ordered to pay Jesse $22,000
in order to achieve an equitable distribution of the marital property.168
Three years later, Nikki filed for bankruptcy and claimed the home as
exempt property.169 She listed the $22,000 obligation to Jesse as an
unsecured debt, but in case the obligation was viewed as a lien, she
sought to have it avoided under section 522(f)(I).170
The bankruptcy court held that the debt was a consensual lien
created by the consent and agreement of the parties in the property
settlement and, therefore, not avoidable under section 522(f)(1) since
the provision only applies to judicial liens. l7l However, the district
court held that the lien was a judicial lien and allowed Nikki to avoid
it. l72 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. First, the
court agreed that the lien was a judicial lien. 173 Then, the court found
that the divorce decree extinguished Jesse's pre-existing interest in the
property as the decree specifically stated that Nikki was to get the
home free and clear of any and all claims of her husband. 174 Conse
quently, the court concluded that the lien could only have attached to
Nikki's interest in the homeY!!
2. In re Borman 176
In In re Borman, pursuant to the divorce decree, the former wife
was allowed to retain possession of the home and make mortgage pay
166. 837 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1988).
167. Id. at 937 (quoting from the Maus' property settlement agreement, which was
incorporated in the divorce decree).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. See supra note 111 for a definition of consensual lien.
172. Maus, 837 F.2d at 937.
173. The court stated that, under Kansas law, any obligation arising under chapter
60 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated is considered a judicial lien, and since divorce pro
ceedings are commenced under chapter 60, the husband's claim was considered a judicial
lien. Id. at 938.
174. Id. at 939.
175. Id.
176. 886 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989).

244

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:221

ments until the house was appraised. 177 After the appraisal, the hus
band was to pay the wife one-half of the appraised value and then
receive title to the house. 178 On the husband's motion, the trial court
modified the divorce decree to require the husband to pay the wife
approximately $19,000 as a condition for receiving title to the
house. 179 The debt to the ex-wife was to be secured by a lien on the
marital home, which had been held in a joint tenancy.180 However,
when the cash settlement was due, Mr. Borman filed for bankruptcy
and claimed a homestead exemption on the house. 181 Subsequently,
Borman filed a motion to avoid his former wife's lien. 182 The bank
ruptcy court allowed Borman to avoid his wife's lien and the district
court affirmed. 183
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and held
that the divorce lien could not be avoided. 184 The court determined
that the divorce lien was an equitable lien and that avoidance of it
would lead to unjust enrichment of the debtor spouse since "it [was]
clear the property was intended to be the source from which the debt
would be paid."18s The court, adopting the rationale it employed in In
re Donahue, 186 distinguished its earlier decision in Maus by stating
that "the critical difference [was] that the decree in Maus awarded the
property to the debtor spouse free and clear of any claims of the non
debtor spouse." 187
177. Id. at 273.
178. Id. at 273-74.
179. Id. at 274.
180. Id.
181. Id. The wife did not object to the husband's claimed exemption. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 274. In reaching its holding, the Borman court relied predominately on
the reasoning in Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (lOth Cir. 1988). Dona~
hue did not deal directly with the question of avoidance of a divorce lien, but rather
whether such a lien was an equitable lien or equitable mortgage. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that where a divorce decree intends, either implicitly or explicitly,
that a specific property of one spouse secure a debt to the other spouse, the decree creates
an equitable lien upon that property. Id. at 265-66. Use of the term "lien" was not neces
sary in the divorce agreement. Alternative words, such as "subject to," that establish that
the property was to be security for the debt are sufficient. Id. at 265 n.9. The court held
that whether the creditor spouse's interest was called an equitable lien or an equitable mort
gage, the debt was secured. Id. at 266.
185. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274.
186. 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988).
187. Borman, 886 F.2d at 274.
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Application of Farrey to Joint Tenancies

Like Farrey, Maus and Borman involved homesteads held during
marriage as joint tenancies. Also like Farrey, Maus and Borman in
volved divorce decrees that extinguished the spouses' pre-existing un
divided half interests, created new property interests for each spouse
who was granted the home, and created divorce liens for the other
spouse. 188 Based on these similarities, it would seem that after Farrey
divorce liens in joint tenancy situations like Maus and Borman would
not be avoided, just as the Farrey lien was not avoided.
This result is clear in Borman, but is less obvious in Maus. In
Borman, under the modified divorce decree the husband was not to
receive full title to the house until after he had paid his debt to his ex
wife. 189 Even before the divorce decree was modified, the house was to
be held in a joint tenancy until the husband paid the wife one-half of
the appraised value}90 Therefore, under Farrey, the husband would
never have "possessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it
fixed,"19l and thus could not have avoided his wife's lien.
In Maus, the spouses similarly had held the home in a joint ten
ancy prior to the divorce and, after the divorce, one spouse (the wife,
Nikki) possessed the home with her husband's lien attached. Seem
ingly, Farrey would prevent Nikki from avoiding her former hus
band's lien. However, in Farrey, the Supreme Court recognized that
the critical question of when the debtor came into possession of the
interest to which the divorce lien attached was a question of state
law. 192 Under Kansas law (controlling in Maus), on the filing of a
divorce petition, "each spouse becomes the owner of a vested, but un
determined, interest in all property individually or jointly held. . . .
[However], [t]he court may cut off all of a spouse's rights to property
by using specific language."193 This was done in the Maus decree.
Unlike Farrey, where the divorce decree stated that Mr.
Sanderfoot acquired the property" 'free and clear' of any claim 'ex
cept as expressly provided in this [decree},' "194 the Maus' divorce de
cree stated that Nikki was "hereby granted [the marital home] as her
sole and separate property free and clear of any and all claims of
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra notes 166-87 and accompanying text.
Borman, 886 F.2d at 274.
Id. at 273-74.
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991).
Id.
Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935,939 (10th Cir. 1988).
Farrey, III S. Ct. at 1830 (emphasis added).
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[Jesse)."19S While Sanderfoot "took [his new] interest and the lien to
gether, as . . . an already encumbered estate,"196 it can be argued that
Nikki first acquired an unencumbered estate and then Jesse's lien was
fixed upon it. Because Jesse's lien could only have attached to Nikki's
interest, it would be subject to avoidance under section 522(f)(1) even
after Farrey.
While this argument for avoidance of Jesse's lien essentially puts
form over substance and disregards the intent of Nikki and Jesse Maus
prior to the drafting of the divorce decree, this kind of interpretation
and result has not been eliminated by Fa"ey. Although "adept draft
ing" can mitigate and possibly eliminate this potential problem in joint
tenancy situations, sole ownerships present a more difficult problem.

B.

Sole Ownership: Boyd v. Robinson 197 and In re Pederson 198

Both Boyd and Pederson involved homes that were purchased by
one spouse prior to marriage and held solely by that spouse during the
marriage. Each home was granted to the spouse who had originally
purchased the home. However, in Boyd the court did not allow the
wife to avoid her ex-husband's lien, while in Pederson the court al
lowed the husband to avoid his ex-wife's lien.
1.

Boyd v. Robinson 199

In Boyd v. Robinson, title to the home was held solely by the wife
(Boyd) since she had purchased the home prior to the marriage. 2oo In
the divorce proceeding Boyd was awarded the home "subject to a lien
for one-half of the equity acquired by the parties together after mar
riage."201 Boyd filed a petition for bankruptcy and tried to avoid her
195. Maus, 837 F.2d at 937. When a divorce decree awards a home "free and clear
of all claims" of the former spouse, it had generally been held that the spouse who retained
the home had the only interest in the home and the divorce lien attached to that interest.
See. e.g., id. at 937-39. However, when a divorce settlement awards the home "subject to"
the lien of the other spouse and it is clear that the home is to be the source of funds to
effectuate the division of the marital property, some courts have created an equitable lien in
favor of the non-debtor spouse and generally held it could not be avoided. Borman v.
Leiker (In re Borman), 886 F.2d 273, 274 (10th Cir. 1989). See supra note 184 for further
discussion of equitable liens and treatment of them by the courts.
196. Fa"ey, III S. Ct. at 1830.
197. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
198. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989).
199. 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). See supra notes 86-113 for a more detailed
discussion of Boyd.
200. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113.
201. Id. (citing to the Designated Record (D.R.) 27).
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ex-husband's divorce lien under section 522(f)(I).202 The bankruptcy
court classified his lien as a judicial lien and allowed Boyd to avoid her
ex-husband's lien. 203 The district court reversed as it determined the
lien was an equitable mortgage rather than a judicial lien. 204
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the
court held that Boyd could not avoid the lien that her ex-husband
(Robinson) held on the marital home since the lien attached to Robin
son's pre-existing interesVos In reaching this conclusion, the court
primarily relied on the Minnesota statutory law that created Robin
son's pre-existing interest. 206

2. In re Pederson 207
In the dissolution decree for the marriage of Earnest Pederson
and Bonnie Stedman the state court granted the marital home to Ped
erson as his "sole and separate property."208 Prior to the marriage,
Pederson owned the marital home as his separate property.209 How
ever, in recognition that certain improvements had been made out of
marital funds, Stedman was granted an $8000 lien to run "against the
real property."210 Less than three weeks after the divorce decree was
finalized, Pederson filed for bankruptcy, claimed a homestead exemp
tion and moved to avoid Stedman's lien on the home pursuant to sec
tion 522(f)(1).211 The bankruptcy court denied the motion. 212 The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the bankruptcy court's decision
and avoided Stedman's lien. 213 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed. 214
The court of appeals noted three reasons in support of its deci
sion. First, based on the definitions of lien and judicial lien in the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 594-95 (D. Minn. 1983),off'd,
741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
205. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1113-14. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text.
206. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114.
207. 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989).
208. Id. at 783 (citing In re Pederson, No. 85-3-00646-1, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. July
3, 1986». The decree did not provide for alimony, support, or maintenance payments. Id.
at 782.
209. Id. at 782.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. The bankruptcy court determined that the lien was not a judicial lien as
defined under the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, it was not subject to § 522(f)(1). Id.
213. Id. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that Stedman's lien was a judicial
lien under the Code and could be avoided under § 522(f)(I). Id.
214. Id. at 782-84.

248

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:221

Code,215 the court held that the wife's lien was a judicial lien because it
was created by a judgment and was a "charge against" the marital
home, which was awarded to Pederson in order to secure payment of
the equitable distribution of the marital property.216 Second, since the
"dissolution decree clearly indicate[d] that Stedman's lien attached to
Pederson's property [interest]," the court held that Stedman's lien im
paired Pederson's homestead exemption. 217 Finally, the court found
that Stedman had no pre-existing interest in the homestead to which
the divorce lien could have attached. 218 The court's reasoning focused
on the ability of a state court under Washington law to award title to
the residence outright to one spouse. 219 Since the dissolution decree
entered by the state court specifically granted the home to Pederson as
his "sole and separate property," at the time of the divorce only Peder
son possessed an interest to which a lien could attach.220
3.

Application of Farrey to Sole Ownerships

Under Farrey, the "critical inquiry [is] whether the debtor ever
possessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed."221
Where a sole ownership exists, only one party has title to the property.
When a couple divorces, if the spouse with title is the spouse granted
the marital home, arguably that spouse has and had the only property
interest in the marital home. Therefore, that spouse possessed the in
terest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed. Accordingly, the divorce
lien would attach to that spouse's interest and could be avoided under
section 522(f)(I).
In Pederson, not only was title to the marital home in Pederson's
name before and during the marriage, but the state court's dissolution
order granted the home to him as his "sole and separate property. "222
Even though Stedman (the wife) was granted a lien representing her
"interest" in the marital home, the dissolution decree stated that her
lien was to attach to Pederson's separate real property.223 Therefore,
the lien attached to Pederson's "sole and separate" interest, and under
215. See supra notes 109, 110 and accompanying text for the Code's definitions of
lien and judicial lien, respectively.
216. In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781, 782 (9th Cir. 1989).
217. Id. at 783.
218. Id. (adopting the rationale of Maus).
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting In re Pederson, No. 85-3-00646-1, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. July 3,
1986».
221. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 111 S. Ct. 1825, 1830 (1991).
222. Pederson, 875 F.2d at 783.
223. Id. Although the equitable distribution law in Washington recognized that
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Farrey's interpretation of section S22(f)(1), Pederson possessed his fee
simple interest before the lien fixed and could avoid his wife's lien.
The divorce lien in Boyd is more problematic. As stated before,
the critical question under Farrey is "whether the debtor ever pos
sessed the interest to which the lien fixed, before it fixed."224 Like
Pederson, Boyd (the wife) held title to the marital home solely in her
name prior to the divorce as well as after the divorce. 22s Applying
Farrey literally, Boyd possessed the specific interest to which the lien
fixed, before the lien fixed. Consequently, the lien could be avoided
under section S22(f)(1).
However, title alone may not be determinative of what interest a
spouse possessed in the marital home prior to the fixing of the lien.
The Court, in Farrey, stated that this critical inquiry is a question of
state law. 226 Since every state has adopted some form of equitable dis
tribution in the area of divorce law, either by statute or judicial deci
sion,227 the doctrine must be taken into account by the bankruptcy
courts and other federal courts when determining the "pre-existing in
terests" of both divorcing spouses .
. According to Minnesota statutory law (controlling in Boyd), each
spouse has an "undivided interest in marital property from the time it
is acquired."228 Consequently, one can argue that Robinson (Boyd's
husband) had an interest in the marital home prior to the divorce and,
although title to the home was solely in Boyd's name, Boyd had less
than a fee simple interest. Moreover, the dissolution decree in Boyd
expressly stated that Boyd was to receive the marital home "subject
to" a lien for one-half of the equity acquired by Boyd and Robinson
after marriage,229 in contrast to Pederson where the divorce decree
granted the property outright to Pederson. Use of the words "subject
to" in the divorce decree provides the argument that the divorce de
cree first extinguished Boyd's and Robinson's pre-existing interests
and then created for Boyd a new fee simple interest already encum
bered by her husband's lien. Applying Farrey to this view of the prop
erty interests, the husband's lien could not be avoided.
Although this last approach reaches the equitable result,
Stedman had an interest in the marital home, that interest was effectively extinguished by
the wording used in the divorce decree.
224. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830 (emphasis added).
225. Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 1984).
226. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1830.
227. See supra note 63.
228. Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114.
229. Id. at 1113.
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problems do exist with it. First, the mere existence of an equitable
distribution law may not be enough to create a pre-existing interest
where property ostensibly belongs to one spouse. Second, even if equi
table distribution law does create a pre-existing interest for the non
titled spouse, the wording used in a divorce decree can be interpreted
to have extinguished the interest created under equitable distribution
law prior to the fixing of the lien, as was done in Pederson.
Unfortunately, Farrey does not provide any guidance in these ar
eas. First, Farrey dealt with property held in a joint tenancy, which
presents fewer difficulties in determining the pre-existing interests of
the spouses than does sole ownership. Second, and more importantly,
Sanderfoot (the debtor spouse in Farrey) did not challenge the charac
terization of Wisconsin law as extinguishing the prior interests of both
spouses and creating new ones. 230 Since the Court did not discuss this
issue, the question of whether equitable distribution law can create an
enforceable pre-existing interest in property that otherwise appears to
belong entirely to someone else is one with which the lower courts will
have to struggle.
Farrey may, however, afford the lower courts a means of avoiding
the problem of determining pre-existing interests in sole ownership sit
uations. Since the Court did not address whether a divorce lien is a
judicial lien,231 focusing instead on whether the lien attached to the
debtor's interest in the marital home, the lower courts may be able to
rely on the consensual lien theory or the equitable lien theory to re
frain from applying section 522(f)(1) to a particular divorce lien. 232
Classification of a divorce lien as a consensual lien renders section
522(f)(1) inapplicable since the provision only applies to judicial
liens. 233 Some courts have classified divorce liens as consensual liens
when the liens were created by the consent and agreement of the par
ties in their separation agreement and then incorporated by the court
into their divorce decree as a matter of formality.234 When the
spouses have not previously agreed to a lien and the lien is created
entirely by the court, some courts have held that the lien is an equita
ble lien and did not avoid the lien on that basis.23s However, in con
230. Farrey, 111 S. Ct. at 1831-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
231. Ms. Farrey did not challenge the court of appeals' determination that her lien
was .a judicial lien. Id. at 1828.
232. See supra notes 184 -85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equitable
lien theory.
233. See supra note 4 for text of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
234. See In re McCormmach, 111 B.R. 330 (Bankr. D. Or. 1990); Wicks v. Wicks,
26 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982).
235. See Parker v. Donahue (In re Donahue), 862 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1988); In re
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trast to consensual liens which are not judicial liens, there is no
consensus on whether equitable liens are judicial liens. 236
Nevertheless, the same interpretation problems that exist with de
termining a debtor's interest in the marital home also exist in deter
mining whether a divorce lien is a judicial lien. When the wording
used in the divorce decree awards the property to the debtor spouse
free and clear of any claims of the non-debtor spouse, this wording
gives rise to the argument that the prior agreement is now void and the
lien that was created was a general judgment lien, even though the
parties previously agreed to a lien on the home. 237 In addition, some
courts hold divorce liens to be judicial liens simply because they were
imposed by the filing of a judgment and decree in a court, ignoring the
substantive nature of the consensual agreement between the parties. 238
Furthermore, other courts look to federal law to determine whether a
divorce lien is a judicial lien, specifically the Code definitions of "lien"
and "judicial lien. "239
Since the Supreme Court has, however, "consistently recognized
that '[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife
... belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States,' "240 a federal definition of "judicial lien" for bankruptcy pur
poses should not override state definitions for family law purposes. 241
Conway, 93 B.R. 731 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988); Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 B.R. 956
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1985); Wozniak v. Wozniak, 359 N.W.2d 147 (Wis. 1984).
236. Several courts have held that divorce liens are equitable liens. However, these
courts have differed on whether equitable liens are judicial liens. See Hartley v. Liberty
Park Assocs., 774 P.2d 40 (Wash. App. 1989) (holding that an equitable lien is not a judi
ciallien); Zachary v. Zachary, 99 B.R. 916 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (same); In re Warren, 91 B.R.
930 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (same). But see In re Stone, 119 B.R. 222 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1990) (holding that an equitable lien is a judicial lien); In re Dudley, 68 B.R. 426 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1986) (same).
237. See In re Pederson, 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); Maus v. Maus, 837 F.2d 935,
939 (10th Cir. 1988).
238. Wood v. Godfrey (In re Godfrey), 102 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989);
Duncan v. Sczepanski (In re Duncan), 85 B.R. 80, 82-83 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
239. See In re Boggess, 105 B.R. 470, 474-75 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1989); In re Brothers,
100 B.R. 565, 567-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). 11 U.S.C. § 101(33) (1988) defines "lien"
as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of
an obligation." Id. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988) defines '~udiciallien" as a "lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id.
240. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890». The Court further stated that when state family law confticts with a federal
statute, the Court's review under the Supremacy Clause is limited to a determination of
whether Congress has clearly mandated that federal law preempt state law. Id. In order
for a state law governing domestic relations to be overridden, it "must do 'major damage'
to 'clear and substantial' federal interests." Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581
(1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966».
241. The federal definitions of lien and judicial lien should not create a question of
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Moreover, to uphold a divorce lien when the lien is agreed to by the
parties, but avoid the lien when it is created by the family court "ig
nores the function and purpose of the marriage dissolution proceed
ings and creates an artificial and unfair distinction between the two
manners of distributing property."242 Such a distinction undermines
the equity powers of the state courts in granting enforceable judg
ments, especially since "the family courts are considerably limited in
the methods available to them to perform their dictated functions. "243
In summary, although Farrey has essentially resolved the ques
tion in joint tenancy situations of whether a spouse who was granted
the marital home in divorce can avoid a divorce lien that was held by
the former spouse and was created during the distribution of marital
property at divorce, the decision has left many issues unanswered in
sole ownership situations. Since the "critical" inquiry is a "question of
state law,"244 divorce liens can still be avoided by virtue of the choice
of words used in the divorce decree, the interpretation of these words,
and the application of pertinent state law by various courts. Although
conscientious drafting may mitigate this inequitable result, due to the
variance among state divorce laws the possibility still exists for ex
spouses with divorce liens to be left vulnerable to the scheming ex
spouse who tries to unilaterally modify the divorce decree in complete
disregard of the state courts and the state statutes requiring an equita
ble distribution of the marital property. This wi11lead to arbitrary and
inconsistent results where in virtually identical situations some divorce
liens will be avoided while others will not, thereby, creating more, not
less, confusion and conflict.

preemption. See Boyd v. Robinson (In re Boyd), 31 B.R. 591, 596 (D. Minn. 1983),off'd,
741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984). The court stated:
Federal courts have traditionally abstained when faced with family law questions
.... Given this unique character of family law, for the bankruptcy court to
impose such a formalistic approach in its decision while ignoring the purpose of
the marriage dissolution proceedings and intent of the family court is to come
dangerously close to imposing its own judgment in place of the family courts ....
[This] is not a proper subject for review of or preemption by the federal bank
ruptcy court ... [for which it] can remove jurisdiction over the disposition of
marital assets from the state trial and Supreme Courts or grant to a federal court
the power to supercede, ... or alter a marital distribution [created in the state
courts].
Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, III S. Ct. 1825,1830 (1991).
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PROPOSAL FOR REsOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT-AN
AMENDMENT TO THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Bankruptcy law is guided by the Code, but divorce law has no
such uniform code. 245 As a result, divorcing spouses are subject to the
laws of their states that control divorces and divorce liens. Although
state courts have an incentive to see that their decisions are enforce
able, confusion, conflict, and controversy exist among the federal
courts handling this issue. The determination of whether to avoid a
particular divorce lien is highly fact driven and extremely dependent
upon individual state law in the area of domestic relations. 246 The
Supreme Court's decision in Farrey, while attempting to resolve this
issue, does not go far enough. The most viable solution to this conflict
is to amend section 522(f)(1) of the Code.
A.

Current 11

u.s. C

§ 522(/)(1)

Currently, section 522(f)(1) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid
the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the
extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor
would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such
lien is
. diCl'al lien .... 247
(1) a JU

B.

Proposed Amendment to 11

u.s. C

§ 522(/)(1)

Under the proposed amendment section 522(f)(1) would provide:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid
the fixing of a lien, except for a lien arising from a divorce decree
given to a spouse on the marital home, on an interest of the debtor in
property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which
the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this
section, if such lien is
(1) a judicial lien ....

C.

Discussion of the Proposed Amendment

The proposed amendment eliminates the opportunity for inequi
245. See supra note 68. Although divorce law has no uniform code, there are under
lying policies, like equitable distribution, which do have a somewhat uniform impact. See
supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
247. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(I) (1988).
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table treatment of an ex-spouse with a divorce lien that still exists
under Farrey, while maintaining the spirit and purpose of the Code.
The proposed amendment will minimally, if at all, hinder the "fresh
start" of the debtor since the debtor will receive the same share of the
marital property that he or she would have received after the divorce
had no bankruptcy occurred.
Furthermore, the debtor will still get a "fresh start," but it will be
the fresh start promoted by the Cod~, that is, freedom from consumer
and commercial creditor harassment,248 rather than a type of en
hanced fresh start obtained at the expense of the debtor's former
spouse. As the Supreme Court has stated "the Act limits the opportu
nity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the 'honest but
unfortunate debtor.' "249 The debtor spouse who pursues avoidance of
a divorce lien is generally not the "honest but unfortunate debtor," but
the crafty spouse seeking to circumvent the divorce decree by attempt
ing to avoid the divorce lien. Once the lien is avoided, the debtor
spouse has essentially used (or more aptly, abused) the bankruptcy
system to circumvent the divorce decree in order to evade the debtor's
responsibilities to his or her former spouse. As a result, the debtor
spouse is unjustly enriched by his or her acquisition of the former
spouse's share of the marital property.
Finally, the proposed amendment does not vitiate the homestead
exemption. The homestead exemption, as well as other exemptions, is
permitted against other creditors such as the consumer and commer
cial creditors against whom the exemptions were primarily aimed.
The amended section 522(f)(I) would not allow "[t]he homestead law
. . . [to] be employed by either spouse to wrong the other."2so Fur
thermore, the bankruptcy system would be more efficient because of
decreased litigation through the reduction of conflict between bank
ruptcy law and divorce law.
The Code unquestionably promotes giving a debtor a fresh start,
but that fresh start is presumed to be with his or her own property not
"with someone else's property."2S1 This amendment will allow both
spouses to get a new beginning or fresh start after the divorce.
248. See supra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
249. Grogan v. Gamer, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934».
250. Holtzhauser v. Ho1tzhauser (In re Holtzhauser), 117 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1990) (quoting Best v. Zutavem, 74 N.W. 64 (Neb. 1898».
251. Farrey v. Sanderfoot (In re Sanderfoot), 899 F.2d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 1990) (Pos
ner, J., dissenting), rev'd, III S. Ct. 1825 (1991).
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CONCLUSION

Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is an
important and useful tool in aiding a debtor to achieve a fresh start
after bankruptcy unencumbered by prior debts. However, as enacted,
the provision creates much confusion, difficulty, and controversy for
both the courts and the attorneys involved when the lien sought to be
avoided arises from a divorce settlement.
The proposed amendment would benefit the parties, the attor
neys, and the courts. It would prevent the conniving debtor spouse
from abusing the bankruptcy laws, give both spouses a new beginning,
and provide clearer guidance to attorneys and the courts. In addition,
it would minimize at least one area of conflict between divorce law and
bankruptcy law, reduce litigation, and reinforce the goal of equitable
distribution in the family law area without hindering the fresh start
goal of bankruptcy law. Therefore, in light of the legislative history
and purpose of section 522(f)(l), the policy concerns relevant to our
current society, and the elimination of confusion in the courts and po
tential inequitable results, Congress should amend section 522(f)(1) of
the Code to except from avoidance under it liens on the marital home
that are granted to a former spouse in a divorce proceeding to secure
an equitable distribution of the marital property.
Gail P. Ferris

